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It has been over 20 years since the publication of the first edition of Professor Barendt's 
masterful study of comparative free speech law. In the two decades between the 
publication of the first and this second edition there have been changes of orogenic 
proportions in the legal landscape inhabited by the free speech right. 
Most obviously perhaps, for United Kingdom lawyers anyway, has been the passage 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 ( H R A ) which incorporates the right to freedom of 
expression under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) . 
Thus, for the first time, those within the U K who, hitherto, merely had the freedom of 
speech, as long as that speech was not restricted by statute or common law, are now 
able to claim a positive right to freedom of expression. In a similar vein the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 was virtually brand new at the time of the first 
edition. Since then there have been a series of important decisions developing the 
jurisprudence on freedom of speech, emanating from the Canadian Supreme Court. 
Further there has been a steady and increasing stream of cases coming before the 
courts in different jurisdictions dealing with issues that might never have arisen 20 or 
30 years ago. Examples include hate speech; holocaust denial; issues concerning 
copyright and the growth of the cult of celebrity with the concomitant conflict between 
freedom of expression and privacy. Indeed privacy itself is now afforded greater legal 
protection in the U K due to the boost given to breach of confidence by the 
incorporation of article 8 E C H R . 1 
Another huge change impacting upon freedom of speech has been not a legal but a 
technological one: the inception and meteoric rise of the world wide web, the internet 
and email, making possible, for huge numbers of people, instantaneous global 
communication. 
Given the complexity of these constitutional, legal, technological and cultural shifts, 
even to produce a work covering the law of free speech in England and Wales would 
be a major achievement. But this is a comparative work dealing in addition and in 
detail with the varying approaches to free speech in the United States, Germany, 
Canada and by the European Court and Commission of Human Rights at Strasbourg, 
as well as in, to a lesser extent, a range of other jurisdictions. 
As a consequence of the changes outlined above the second edition of Freedom of 
Speech is a much longer book than its predecessor (the number of pages has expanded 
from 344 to 526) and there are several completely new chapters. However, the core 
approach of the book, which, to this reviewer's mind is its greatest strength, has 
remained. This is the linking thread that begins with the question posed in Chapter I: 
"Why Protect Free Speech?" Expression rights are less obviously worthy of protection 
than some other human rights (life; freedom from torture; physical liberty). There are 
many important interests that will, in particular situations, come into conflict with 
freedom of speech {eg, privacy, reputation, dignity, freedom from being caused offence, 
upholding morals, national security, fair trial). Indeed it is only when there is a conflict 
with some such interest that the free speech right becomes important, for when speech 
is innocuous, when no other interests are challenged, there is no reason to restrict it. 
It is therefore essential to establish, at the outset, why free speech is valued at all. To 
this end Chapter I explains and analyses the classic arguments justifying the free speech 
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right: that it is necessary for the pursuit of truth; for the attainment of individual 
self-fulfilment or autonomy; or that that it is a sine qua non of representative 
democracy. The extent to which these underpinning philosophical justifications lie 
behind judicial approaches (either expressly or, more usually, implicitly) to the 
protection of expression rights is a thread linking the subsequent chapters and 
facilitating the comparative approach. As the balance of underlying justifications varies 
between jurisdictions so do the levels of protection afforded to different types of free 
speech interest (political, journalistic, artistic, pornographic, commercial). This 
approach was one of the great strengths of the first edition of Freedom of Speech: and 
it remains so; and, despite the tectonic shifts outlined above, the various justifications 
as to why we value freedom of speech remain. 
There is, in such an ambitious and wide ranging work, the ever present risk of the 
reader getting lost in the complexities of the jurisprudence of unfamiliar jurisdictions 
(especially, for U K and European lawyers, the First Amendment case law of the USA). 
Re-grounding the discussion in the reasons why we value free speech in the first place 
provides the reader with a compass enabling navigation through the labyrinth. Freedom 
of Speech achieves this tremendously difficult task with lucidity, fluency and elegance. 
After the introduction to the philosophical underpinnings in Chapter I the following 
three chapters go on to discuss issues of general importance: Chapter II, "Free Speech 
in Liberal Legal Systems", introduces the approaches of the main jurisdictions under 
consideration; Chapter III, "The Scope of Freedom of Speech", considers the 
interesting and important threshold question - what is speech? - a question the 
resolution of which has been particularly important in the USA given the apparently 
absolute protection afforded to "speech" by the First Amendment: when, for example, 
can forms of expressive conduct be considered speech? Chapter IV, "Prior Restraints", 
examines the traditional hostility of the law to censoring expression before it has the 
chance to enter the "market place of ideas" (rather than letting the speaker take his 
or her chance with the civil or criminal law once he or she has spoken). 
Having laid solid foundations the author goes on, in the remaining ten chapters, to 
analyse the whole range of free speech interests in the various jurisdictions under 
consideration. These chapters cover: political speech; libel and invasion of privacy; 
copyright and other property rights; meetings, protest and public order; free speech and 
the judicial process; pornography; commercial speech; freedom of speech and the 
media, freedom of speech and the internet; and freedom of speech in special contexts 
(which considers for example limitations on election expenditure, freedom of speech in 
employment and free speech in education and in prisons). Of these, the last four are 
completely new chapters. 
Perhaps one of the most surprising and disappointing messages of the book, for the 
domestic reader at least, is that whilst free speech law in the U K "has in principle been 
transformed by the incorporation of the ECHR . . . [i]n fact it is doubtful whether the 
change has so far been much more than cosmetic".2 Analysis of approaches by the 
courts in such cases as R v Shayler3 (in which the Official Secrets Act 1989 was found 
to be compatible with article 10 despite the absence of any public interest defence) and 
R (on the application of the ProLife Alliance) v BBC4 (in which the BBC's refusal, on 
the grounds of taste and decency, to broadcast a political party's election broadcast 
depicting an abortion was found not to breach article 10) would seem to bear out this 
conclusion. The recent case of R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) 
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v Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport)5 in which the blanket ban imposed 
by the Communications Act 2003 on all advertisements in the broadcast media that 
could even loosely be described as "political" was held to be compatible with article 
10, notwithstanding apparently clear Strasbourg jurisprudence indicating otherwise,6 
would seem to be further confirmation of this timidity. 
The new edition of Freedom of Speech comes at a critical point. At a time of 
heightened anxiety about security there is always the temptation on governments to 
impose restrictions on the expression of certain groups. Justifications for freedom of 
expression are all the more important at such times. Also, however, in recent years 
there has been an increased sensitivity by those who perceive that the liberal, secular, 
human rights culture appears to value freedom of speech above other rights and 
interests. Perhaps something of this can be discerned in the furore concerning the 
publication (and worldwide re-publication in the name of free speech) of Danish 
cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad, provoking outrage and violence in the 
Muslim world.7 It is at times like these that we need to think carefully about why 
exactly we value freedom of speech and the extent to which it should receive heightened 
protection. It may well be that it should; but it is surely not good enough to dispense 
with the philosophical underpinnings and simply assert: "it's freedom of speech - I will 
say it because I can say it". It is for this reason, as well as many others, that the second 
edition of Freedom of Speech is so timely and important. It deserves to be read by 
scholars, legal practitioners and all those interested in this important, complex and 
fascinating area. 
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